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CASE NOTES

Constitutional Law - RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT
TITLE
VII OF THE CIVILRIGHTSACT OF 1964 AND THE FCC NONDISCRIMININATION REGULATIONS
- King's Garden, Inc. v . FCC, 498 F.2d
5 1 (D.C. Cir. 1974),cert. denied, 95 S . Ct. 309 (1974).
King's Garden, Inc. is a religious organization which owns and operates two radio stations. A letter of complaint was filed with the Federal
Communications Commission alleging that King's Garden was violating
the Commission's nondiscrimination regulations1 by discriminating on
the basis of religion in choosing employees. In response, King's Garden
filed a memorandum of law based upon the Civil Rights Act of 19642and
the free exercise clause of the first amendment, contending that as a religious organization engaged in religious activity, it should be exempt
from the Commission's ban on religious discrimination in employment.
The Commission rejected this contention3 and ruled that only "those
persons hired to espouse a particular religious philosophy over the air
~
to this
should be exempt from the nondiscrimination r ~ l e s . ' ' Prior
ruling, but subsequent to the filing of the memorandum of law, the Civil
Rights Act was amended to allow religious organizations to discriminate
in employment on the basis of religion in all activities, not only in re~
Garden notified the
ligious activities as previously a l l o ~ e d .King's
Commission of this amendment and requested that the Commission alter
its holding to conform with the new legislation. The Commission, however, reaffirmed its prior r ~ l i n g T
. ~h e Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia affirmed, holding that the Commission is not required to
incorporate the 1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act into its nondis-

-

I47 C.F.R. $5 73.125, 73.301 (1972). Section 73.125 applies to AM broadcasting, and section
73.301 applies to FM broadcasting. The two sections are identically worded, stating, in part:
(a) General Policy. Equal opportunity in employment shall be afforded by all licensees or
permittees of commercially or noncommercially operated standard, FM, television or international broadcast stations (asdefined in this part) to all qualified persons, and no person shall be
discriminated against in employment because of race, color, religion, national origin or sex.
242 U.S.C. $5 1981 et seq. (1970). T h e memorandum relied primarily on 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-1
(1970) which (prior to the 1972 amendment) allowed religious organizations to discriminate
"with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation . . . of its religious activities. . . . " T h e
memorandum also relied on 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-2 (e) (1970) which permits discrimination i n
employment "on the basis of . . . religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."
3Trygve J. Anderson, 34 F.C.C.2d 937 (1972), aff'd sub nom. King's Garden, Inc., 38 F.C.C.
2d 339 (1972), aff'd sub nom. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 95 S . Ct. 309 (1974).
4Zd. at 938.
5Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-1 (Supp. 11, 1972),amending
42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-1 (1970).
6King's Garden, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d 339 (1972), aff'd sub nom. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC,
498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 309 (1974).
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crimination regulations, and that the FCC regulations give adequate
protection to the first amendment freedoms of religious broadcaster^.^

A. The Communications Act of 1934
Congress created the Federal Communications Commission by the
Communications Act of 1934.8 This Act gives the Commission the mandate to license radio stations "as public convenience, interest, or necessity
requires,"9 and the authority to " [m] ake such rules and regulations and
prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter. "lo The Commission wields "expansive powersW1lunder this Act, as long as it stays
within the "vagueish, penumbral bounds expressed by the public interest. "12
Pursuant to this authority the Commission in 1968 promulgated regulations providing that "no person shall be discriminated against in employment because of race, color, religion, national origin or sex. "'3 These
regulations were based both upon the policies expressed by the "public
interest" mandate of the Communications Act and the "national policy
against discrimination in employment . . . embodied in Section VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.?'I4

B. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
T h e Civil Rights Act is one of the basic legislative weapons against
discrimination. Title VII of the Act is specifically directed toward the
elimination of discrimination in employment, and the legislative history
behind this title clearly indicates that it establishes the national policy
against discrimination in employment.l5
'King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 309 (1974).
847 U.S.C. $5 151 et seq. (1970).
9Zd. 8 303 (1970).
loZd. 5 303(r) (1970).
"National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,216 (1942).
12FCCv. RCA Comminications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86,91 (1953).
1347 C.F.R. $5 73.125, 73.301 (1972). T h e text of the regulations is set forth, in part, at note 1
supra.
'4Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in Their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766,767 (1968). In this memorandum, the Commission announced
its intent to foster the policies of the Civil Rights Act by promulgating nondiscrimination
regulations. It recognized that the Civil Rights Act provisions were applicable to a significant
number of broadcast licensees (Id. at 768), and acknowledged that, in upholding its public
interest mandate, it must consider such policies (Id. at 769).
15

T h e purpose of this title [title VII Civil Rights Act of 19641 is to eliminate, through the
utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in employment
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The Act originally provided that the ban on religious discrimination
in employment shall not apply
to a religious corporation, association, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, or society of
its religious activities.l6

The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 amended this section,
inter alia, by striking the word "religious" before "activities. " T h e legislative history of the amendment clearly indicates that Congress intended
the exemption to be broad enough to reach all activities of all religious
organizations.lT The far-reaching implications of this amendment must
be examined against the religion clauses of the first amendment.

C . T h e Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
1. Free Exercise. T h e free exercise clause prohibits governmental
regulation of religious beliefs and practices, and bars governmental inter-

based on race, color, religion, or national origin. The title a&horizes the establishment of
a Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and delegates to it the primary
responsibility for preventing and eliminating unlawful employment practices as defined
in the title.
Section 701 (a) sets forth a congressional declaration that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States have a right to the opportunity for employment without discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin. It is also declared to be
the national policy to protect the right of persons to be free from such discrimination.
1964 U.S. CODECONG.& AD. NEWS240 1.
'642 U.S.C. 5 2000e-1 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-1 (Supp. 11, 1972) (emphasis
added). For a discussion of title VII prior to the 1972 amendment see Note, Title VZZReligious Discrimination in Employment -Zs "Effect on Individual Religious Belief"
Discrimination Based on Religion under the Civil Rights Act of l964f 16 WAYNE
L. h v . 327
L.
(1969); Comment, Religious Observance and Discrimination in Employment, 22 SYRACUSE
h v . 1019 (1971).
"Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., in introducing the amendment, stated that it
would exempt religious corporations, associations, and societies from the application of
this act insofar as the right to employ people of any religion they see fit is concerned. . . .
In other words, this amendment is to take the hands of Caesar off the institutions of God,
where they have no place to be.
SUBCOMM.
O N LABOR
OF THE SENATE
COMM.O N LABOR AND PUBLIC
WELFARE,
9 2 CONG.,
~
2~
SESS., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
OF THE EQUALEMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY
ACT OF 1972 1645
(Comm. Print 1972).
Similarly, the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Managers at the Conference on the Bill
states:
[TI he Senate provision expanded the exemption for religious organizations from coverage under this title with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion
in all their activities instead of the present limitation to religious activities.
1972 U.S. CODECONG.& AD.NEWS2180.
See generally G. Sape & T. Hart, Title VIZ Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO.WASH.L. h v . 824 (1972); Note, Civil Rights- Religious Discrimination in Private Employment Under Title VZZ of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3
CUMBER-SAM.
L. REV.497 (1972).
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ference with the dissemination of religious ideas.lB Numerous special
privileges and exemptions from state control have been granted to individuals and religious organizations under this clause.lg
In determining whether a government activity or regulation violates
the free exercise clause, the Supreme Court uses a balancing test. First,
the Court looks to the nature of the religious interest involved to determine whether it is a legitimate belief or practice20 entitled to constitutional protection.21 Second, it looks to the conflicting state interest in
regulating the religious belief or practice to determine whether the state
interest is of sufficient magnitude to override the religious interest.22
There is a presumption favoring the religious interest, for the Supreme
Court has said that only those state interests "of the highest order and
those not otherwise served" will take precedence over religious interest~.~3
If the state fails to carry its burden of showing an overriding
state interest, the free exercise claim will prevail.
2. i3tablishment. The establishment clause insures governmental
neutrality in religious matters. It is specifically intended to guard against
the evils of sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of
the sovereign in religi0n.~4The Supreme Court has held that a law may
violate the establishment clause even though it does not promote a state
religion and does not aid one religion more than an0ther.~5 However,
the Court has long recognized that the establishment clause does not de'8Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971). See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S.
573 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
lgSee Shetreet, Exemptions and Privileges on Grounds of Religion and Conscience, 62
K Y . L. J. 377 (1973); Pfeffer, T h e Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO.L. J. 1115 (1973); Walz
v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property tax exemption); United States v. Seeger,
380 U.S. 163 (1965) (draft exemption); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (flag salute).
20The traditional distinction between belief and practice established by such cases as
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) and followed by such cases as Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), has not been adhered to by such recent cases as Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See note 23 infra. Also, the Supreme Court has indicated that the
protections of the free exercise clause extend beyond traditional concepts of religion. United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
21Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,215-16 (1972).
22Zd.at 214-15.
23Zd. at 215. T h e facts in Yoder provide a good illustration of the balancing test employed
under the free exercise clause. There a state requirement that all persons attend school
until the age of 16 years conflicted with the Amish belief that education beyond the eighth
grade was improper and would undermine their religious organization. T h e Court considered the relative importance of the state's interest in requiring school attendance in relation to the importance of the asserted religious claims, and found the state interests insufficient
to outweigh the presumption favoring free exercise.
%ee Committee for Public Educ. 8c Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973);
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 95 (1968);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
25Committee for Public Edcc. 8c Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973).
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mand complete separation between church and state;" numerous types
of government involvement with religion have been held constitutional.27 A three-part test has evolved for determining whether a law is valid
under the establishment clause. First, the law must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose; second, the law must have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and third, it must avoid excessive
government entanglement with religion.28
The instant case focused on the status of religious discrimination in
employment under the Communications Act, the Civil Rights Act, and
the religion clauses of the first amendment.

In affirming the Federal Communications Commission's ruling, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the 1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not preempt the Commission's
nondiscrimination regulations, and that the Commission's regulation
adequately protected the constitutional rights of religious broadca~ters.~g
The court, relying heavily on the fact that the legislative history of the
1972 amendment made no explicit reference to the FCC, inferred that
Congress silently approved the nondiscrimination regulations which
were in effect at the time of the amendment's enactment.30 The court
acknowledged that the Commission has a duty to examine new legislation
to determine its relevance to the broadcasting industry,3l and recognized
that the literal language of the amendment is broad enough to cover religious broadcasters such as King's Garden.32 But it emphasized that the
amendment was debated in the context of religious educational institutions, with few references to its broader application, and concluded that
the FCC was justified in finding that the amendment was not intended to
cover such regulated, quasi-public institutions as radio stations.33
The court also reasoned that no religious organization has a constitutional right to hold a broadcast license, and therefore restrictions upon
the use of a license should not be viewed as interference with free exer~ i s e . 3The
~ court described a broadcast license as a public privilege to use
part of the public domain. The scarcity of this broadcast privilege,
26Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
27Seenote 19 supra.
2*Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 41 3 U.S. 756, 773 (1973) (and
cases cited therein).
29498 F.2d 51,53-54 (1974).
3OZd. at 53.
3lZd. at 58.
32Zd.
33Zd. at 54,58-59.
34Zd. at 60.
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coupled with the fact that the privilege is voluntarily assumed by the
licensee, influenced the court to hold that the licensee must adhere to the
regulations established by the FCC without complaint regarding first
amendment freedoms.35
Nevertheless, the court did recognize that a religious broadcaster such
as King's Garden does have a constitutional right to express its religious
beliefs and to give a sectarian tone to its programming.36 It also acknowledged that the Commission's regulations are susceptible to unconstitutional abuse if the FCC were to forbid religious discrimination in programming which constituted a significant expression of the religious organization's sectarian viewpoint.a7 But the court did not resolve this
problem, since the attack was to the facial validity of the FCC regulations, not to their application.
Because the court held the 1972 amendment was inapplicable to the
Commission's regulations, it did not need to reach the issue of the amendment's constitutionality. Yet, a large part of the opinion is dicta devoted
to this issue, and the court concluded that the amendment contravenes
the establishment clause and is much broader than necessary to protect
The court did recognize that under the free exercise
free exer~ise.3~
clause some religious discrimination in employment may be allowed, and
conceded "that Congress may, without violating the Establishment
Clause, expand a religious exemption somewhat beyond the minimal

SgArguably, the exemption granted under the 1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is merely a necessary extension of the free exercise clause insuring that religious expres.
sion is not chilled by governmental intrusion into the internal affairs of religious organizations,
However, most free exercise cases involve religious practices which are more fundamental to
religious doctrine than the right to discriminate in employment. See, e.g., Wisconsin v,
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Even assuming that there is a bona fide free exercise interest in
being allowed to discriminate in employment, the 1972 amendment seems broader than necessary. As the court of appeals points out, the free exercise clause was not intended to permit
religious organizations to discriminate in staffing "a trucking firm,a chain of motels, a race
track, a telephone company, a railroad, a fried chicken franchise, or a professional football
team," yet under the 1972 amendment such discrimination would be condoned. King's
Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51,54 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
T h e court's more compelling argument is that the amendment violates the establishment
clause. T h e amendment does not have a clearly secular legislative purpose, though it does
facilitate separation between church and state. Since the amendment allows religious organizations to discriminate in employment, it seems that the primary effect is the advancement of
religious organizations over nonreligious organizations. T h e only one of the three traditional
criteria for validity under the establishment clause with which the amendment clearly complies
is that it avoids excessive government entanglement with religion. Nevertheless, the amendment seems to grant no special privileges to religious organizations more violative of the establishment clause than those approved in such cases as Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),
and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), where the secular legislative purpose was equally
absent and the primary effect was equally religious.
Here it is intended only to pose the question of the constitutionality of the 1972 amendment, for the court did not find it necessary to resolve this issue. But even assuming,
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boundaries created by the several First Amendment liberties. '99 Nevertheless, the court firmly concluded that there is "no precedent for the unlimited 1972 exemption. "40

A. T h e FCC Regulations and the Civil Rights Act
King's Garden initially raises two related questions. First, do the FCC
nondiscrimination regulations conflict with the amended Civil Rights
Act? Second, if such conflict does exist, should the statute take precedence over the regulations?
1. The FCC regulations conflict with the Civil Rights Act. The
Commission's nondiscrimination regulations clearly contradict the equal
employment provisions of the Civil Rights Act as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. The original Civil Rights Act
provision on religious discrimination in employment was similar to the
current FCC regulations, allowing discrimination only in the religious
activities of religious organizations. However, the 1972 amendment altered that national policy by explicitly stating that religious organizations
are to be exempt from the ban on religious discrimination in all activities.4l
No conflict would exist if the term "activities," as used in the Civil
Rights Act, were narrowly construed so as not to include such commercial ventures as owning radio stations. But, as the court of appeals recognized, such a strained construction would avert the clear meaning of the
statute." The legislative history of the amendment clearly indicates that
the exemption is to apply to all activities of religious organization^.^^
Thus, the court must concede, as it did, that " [t] he literal terms of the
exemption do cover sectarian radio . . . ."44
The court, however, reasoned that no conflict exists between the regulations and the Civil Rights Act because Congress did not indicate that
the 1972 amendment should apply to the FCC's regulation of "quasiargucndo, that the 1972 amendment is unconstitutional, the FCC should consider itself bound
by it until it is struck down by a court of competent jurisdiction. See text accompanying note
62 infra. Furthermore, even if the amendment were struck down, the FCC nondiscrimination
regulations themselves are violative of the free exercise clause. See text accompanying notes
64-93 infra.
39498 F.2d at 56.
401d. at 61. Chief Judge Bazelon filed a short concurring opinion, stating that although the
FCC xnay not contradict a direct congressional enactment, he would hold the 1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional, and therefore not binding on the FCC.
41Seetext accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
42498F.2d at 54 n. 7, 58.
43See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
44498 F.2d at 58 (footnote omitted).
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public" radio stations.45 This conclusion is incorrect since a major purpose of the 1972 amendment was to make the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act applicable to governmental agencies and other public
entities.46 Furthermore, the court recognized that the Commission has a
duty to examine new legislation and to conform FCC policies to relevant
congressional policies.47 It cited with approval the case of McClean
T r u c k i n g Co. v. United States4* where the Supreme Court held that the
Interstate Commerce Commission, in approving a merger of motor carriers, could not ignore the national policies contained in the antitrust
laws, even though, once having been approved by the ICC, the merger
was exempt from the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court declared that
an administrative agency cannot ignore legislative policies that conflict
with its own actions, but must incorporate them into the agency's administrative acti0n.~9 The Court did say that the adjustments which an
agency must make will vary according to the extent to which Congress
indicates a desire to have those policies implemented by the agency.50
Congress is not required, however, under the McClean Trucking doctrine, to specifically enumerate all agencies which should apply a national
policy like the Civil Rights Act. The Commission should have recognized from the clear wording and legislative history of the 1972 amendment that all religious organizations, including religious broadcasters
under FCC jurisdiction, were intended objects of the legislation.
Furthermore, the fact that the amendment was broadening the coverage
of the Civil Rights Act to include public entities should have been signal
enough that the law was relevant to the FCC's mandate and that the nondiscrimination regulations should be altered to conform to this new
national policy.
2. Administrative agencies are bound by Congressional policies. It
is clear that a real conflict exists between the regulations and the statute,
and under a well-accepted principle of statutory interpretation the statute
451d. at 53.
4642 U.S.C. 5 2000e (Supp. 11, 1972). Clearly the amendment was intended to broaden the
Civil Rights Act to reach public entities and governmental agencies as well as private activities.
T h e legislative history states:
T h e bill amends section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (section 2 of the bill) to include State and local governments, governmental agencies and political subdivisions within the definition ofan "employer" under Title VII.

...
T h e bill adds a new section 717 (section 11 of the bill) which . . . gives the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission the authority to enforce the obligations of equal employment opportunity in Federal employment.
1972 U.S. CODECONG.
1L AD. NEWS2152,2155.
47498 F. 2d at 58.
48321 U.S. 67 (1944), appearing at 498 F. 2d at 58.
491d. at 80.
50~d.
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must govern the regulation^.^^ This basic principle is incorporated in
the Communications Act of 1934, the source of the FCC's rule-making
authority, which states that the Commission may only make such regulations as are "not inconsistent with law. "52
The Commission argued that the regulations are not inconsistent
with law, but merely implement the policies of the Civil Rights Act
3
through more stringent standards for the broadcast i n d ~ s t r y . ~Indeed,
other FCC regulations do differ horn the Civil Rights Act in some res p e c t ~ But
. ~ ~the case law clearly establishes that administrative agencies
may not impair congressional policies by proscribing conduct which
Congress by statute has allowed. For example, in FCC v . American
Broadcasting Co." Congress had enacted a statute proscribing certain
types of lotteries. The FCC, by regulation, attempted to prohibit certain
giveaway programs which were not proscribed by the statute. T h e
Supreme Court held that the FCC had "overstepped the boundaries of
interpretation and hence [had] exceeded its rulemaking power" when
it attempted to go beyond the ~ t a t u t e . ~A6 similar situation exists in the
instant case. Congress by statute has established a clearly defined policy
on religious discrimination, but the FCC is attempting to prohibit conduct which the amendment to the Civil Rights Act allows.
Another case announcing the rule that administrative agencies are
bound by congressional policies, Southern Steamship Co. v . NLRB, 57
was cited by Chief Judge Bazelon in his concurrence in King's Garden.
There Congress had enacted legislation which classified any rebellion by
seamen against their officers on board a vessel anywhere within the
admiralty jurisdiction of the United States as a mutiny, but the NLRB in
a fair labor practices hearing declared that a strike by seamen against
their officers was not a mutiny. T h e Supreme Court struck down this
ruling as contradictory to the congressional policy, declaring that although an administrative agency enjoys a great deal of independence, it
has no authority to ignore other congressional objectives and must accornmodate its administrative functions with other statutes.58
S1United States v. Symonds, 120 U.S. 46 (1887).
5247 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1970).
53498 F.2d at 58 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
54For example, the Commission's equal employment regulations apply to all broadcasters
regardless of size, while the Civil Rights Act only applies to employers having more than 15
employees. See King's Garden, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d 339,343 (1972).
55347 U.S. 284 (1954).
561d.at 296.
5'316 U S . 31 (1942).
581d. at 47. Although Southern Steamship differs from King's Garden in that the former
case involved an agency decision excusing conduct which Congress had declared illegal, instead of an agency declaring conduct illegal which Congress had excused, the principle that
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In a case similar to King's Garden, Station W CBS- T V,59 the Commission recognized that FCC regulations could not contravene statutory
policies. There the Commission held that its cigarette advertising regulations promulgated under the authority of the Communications Act
did not contradict the federal policies embodied in the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. But the Commission, in dictum, did recognize
that it could not go beyond those federal policies and enforce stricter
regulations that would require equal time for anticigarette advertising.
I t acknowledged that stricter regulations would "be inconsistent with
congressional direction in this field" and that its "action, therefore must
be tailored so as to carry out the above congressional purpose."60 As
in Station WCBS-T V, the Commission recognized its obligation to
stay within the bounds prescribed by the Cigarette Advertising Act, it
should recognize its obligation to adhere to the policies embodied in the
Civil Rights Act in the instant case.
3. Prior reliance by the FCC upon the Civil Rights Act. In formulating and applying its nondiscrimination regulations, the Commission,
until the 1972 amendment, has relied heavily on the provisions of the
Civil Rights Act and the policies implicit therein.61 This express reliance upon the Civil Rights Act implies that, in formulating its nondiscrimination regulations, the Commission was attempting to follow the
policies of that Act. Similarly, when that Act was amended, the FCC, in
furtherance of this practice of aligning its policies on civil rights with
those of Congress, should have amended its regulations or at least set
forth reasons why it should depart from its prior efforts to stay in step
administrative agencies are bound by congressional policies is well illustrated. See also City of
Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
5 9 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
60Zd. at 382.
61See text accompanying note 14 supra. In Rulemaking to Require Broadcast Licensees to
Show Nondiscrimination in Their Employment Practices, 13 F.C.C.2d 766, 769 (1968), the
Commission explicitly acknowledged the Civil Rights Act as delineating the national policy
against discrimination and expressed its intention of enforcing it:
When these two considerations are taken together - the National policy against discrimination and the nature of broadcasting -we simply do not see how the Commission could
make the public interest finding as to a broadcast applicant who is deliberately pursuing
or preparing to pursue a policy of discrimination-of
violating the National policy.
Similarly, in the initial ruling in the King's Garden matter, the Commission stated:
In keeping with the exemptions you cite from the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Commission believes that those persons hired to espouse a particular religious philosophy over the
air should be exempt from the nondiscrimination rules. But also in keeping with the very
limited nature of the exemptions afforded by the 1964 Act, the Commission does not see
any reason for a broad interpretation that would permit discrimination in the employment of persons whose work is not connected with the espousal of the licensee's religious
views.
Trygve J. Anderson, 34 F.C.C.2d 937,938 (1972) (emphasis added).
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with Congress. Yet no attempt has been made to demonstrate why the
nature of the broadcast industry makes stricter provisions necessary, or
why the "public interest" mandate of the Communications Act requires
nondiscrimination in employment at the expense of free exercise of
religion.
Furthermore, the court erred in reasoning that the Commission was
justified in retaining its stricter regulations, which conflict with the 1972
amendment, because the amendment might be unconstitutional. Every
congressional enactment is presumed constitutional until declared otherwise by a court of competent jurisdiction and an administrative agency
must follow a statute until it is struck down.62

B. T h e FCC Regulations Impinge upon Free Exercise
The court of appeals also held that the Commission's nondiscrimination regulations adequately protected the rights guaranteed by the free
exercise clause by allowing religious discrimination in employment
where the position to be filled is connected with espousal of religion.63
There are, however, several ways the regulations impinge on a religious
broadcaster's rights under the first amendment's free exercise provision.
1. The right to broadcast. The extent of the rights which religious
broadcasters may claim under the free exercise clause has never been
clearly defined, but the court's argument that broadcasters have "no constitutional right to convert a licensed communications franchise into a
church" because such a franchise is a "temporary privilege9'64is clearly
inadequate. For at least a decade courts have rejected the right-privilege
distinction in construing first amendment cases.65 In Banzhaf v . FCC
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia specifically rejected
this distinction:
First Amendment complaints against FCC regulation of content are not
adequately answered by mere recitation of the technically imposed
necessity for some regulation of broadcasting and the conclusory propositions that "the public owns the airwaves" a$ that a broadcast license is
a "revocable privilege." It may well be that some venerable FCC policies
cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny in the light of contemporary
understanding of the First Amendment.66
62Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 392-93 (1895).
63F0r the FCC regulations to be valid under the free exercise clause, they either must not
interfere with a legitimate religious belief or practice, or must be in furtherance of a state
interest of sufficient magnitude to override the religious interests. See text accompanying
notes 20-23 supra.
64498 F.2d at 60.
65See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
66405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (footnote omitted). See Robinson, T h e FCC and the First Amendment: Obseruations on 40 Years of Radio and Television Regulations, 52 M I N N .L. REV.67,
152 (1967).
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Similarly, the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner stated that " [i] t
is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression
may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit
or privilege.''7 Thus, the court does not solve this constitutional issue by
categorizing the holding of a broadcast license as a privilege. The FCC,
in conditioning the "privilege" of holding a broadcast license by restricting the hiring practices of the religious organization which operates the
radio station, is interfering with the free exercise of religion.@
2. T h e right to maintain religious nature. The FCC nondiscrimination regulations would also force King's Garden to abandon its
essentially religious nature69as a condition for obtaining a broadcast
license. The Commission has interpreted the regulations to allow
religious discrimination only as to persons "who, as to content or on-theair presentation, are connected with the espousal of the licensee's religious views. "70 Under this interpretation, announcers who broadcast
musical or other programs which are not strictly espousing religious
views must be hired without regard to their religious attitudes. No
executive, secretarial, technical, sales, or other personnel could be questioned as to their beliefs. In short, King's Garden would be turned into
a completely secular organization so far as its broadcasting activities are
concerned, excepting only those who are hired specifically in connection
with the espousal of religious views.
The Supreme Court, however, has held that no person can be forced in
this manner to choose between pursuing religion and enjoying a state
privilege or benefit. The leading case on this point is Sherbert v .
Ve~ner.~'There a Seventh-Day Adventist was denied unemployment
compensation because she refused to accept employment which involved
working on Saturday, the day recognized as the Sabbath by her faith.
The Court held that the denial of unemployment compensation forced
her to choose between adhering to her religion and forfeiting benefits on
the one hand, or abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order
to accept work on the other. "Governmental imposition of such a choice
puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would
a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship," and is thus
uncon~titutional.~~
The situation in the instant case is similar to Sher67374 U.S. at 404 (1963) (footnote omitted).
68A discussion of the other FCC regulations to which a religious organization must adhere
is beyond the scope of this case note. However, the nondiscrimination regulations can be
distinguished from other FCC regulations because of the direct interference with free exercise
of religion that results from the disallowance of religious discrimination.
69For a discussion of King's Garden's religious nature in relation to its broadcasting
activities, see text accompanying notes 76-79 infra.
70National Religious Broadcasters, Inc., 27 P & F RADIO REG.
2d 875,877 (1973).
71374U.S. 398 (1963).
72Zd.at 404.
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bert in that the Commission's regulations force King's Garden to choose
between maintaining its religious nature and holding a broadcast
license.73
3. T h e right to disseminate religious ideas. T h e FCC, by forcing
King's Garden to abandon its essentially religious nature, also thwarts
King's Garden's efforts to "share Christ world-wide."74 This is a clear
interference with its constitutional right to promulgate its religious
ideas." While King's Garden would still be able to engage in its missionary effort to the extent of sponsoring programs directly expressing
religious views, it also has a right, as the court of appeals recognized, to
give a sectarian tone or perspective to its pr0gramming.~6Such indirect
expression of religious ideals, which is as essential to the espousal of a
religious philosophy as the direct discussion of religious doctrine, would
not be possible without religious discrimination in employment. All
announcers, although not involved directly in the espousal of doctrine,
create the personality of the radio station by their style of speaking, their
taste in program selection, and even by the manner in which they present
and comment on current affairs. All other personnel, while not involved
in speaking over the air, contribute to the atmosphere and attitude of the
station, which is ultimately reflected in its broadcasts. Indeed, the
presence of a large proportion of "nonbelievers" working in the station
would discourage and inhibit the religious personnel from exercising
their beliefs, and may completely discourage such persons from working
for the station. Thus, the court's decision will make it impossible to preserve the spiritual atmosphere that King's Garden desires to maintain in
the station and reflect in its broadcasting.77

73It should be pointed out that King's Garden is not being forced to give up its religious
nature in its entirety, but only so far as related to broadcasting. However, in Sherbert, the
appellant was only forced to abandon her religion so far as it related to Saturday worship.
See text accompanying notes 87-89 infra.
74Petitioner's Brief at 4 states, "King's Garden operates these radio stations as part of its
mission to 'share Christ world wide,' providing programming to fill the definite need of
citizens in the area it serves for religious and inspirational programming." A detailed description of King's Garden's purpose is in the Record at 8-16.
75For the proposition that promulgation of religious ideas is a constitutionally protected
activity, see Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321
U.S. 573 (1944); Murdock v. ~ e n n s ~ l v a n i3a19
, U.S. 105 (1943).
I believe that nothing enjoys a higher estate in our society than the right.. . to practice
and proclaim one's religious convictions.
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,149 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring).
76498 F.2d at 60.
77Petitioner'sBrief at 27-28, citing the trial records, states that:
King's Garden's staff is comparable in many respects to a religious congregation in that it
is a group of persons who come together out of a shared religious belief and who carry on
various helpful activities as an expression of their religious belief. . . . For example, King's
Garden's staff conducts regular religious meetings.
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In addition, all employees of the station are representatives of King's
Garden to the public and all contribute in this manner to the public's
In this sense each emimpression of the King's Garden philo~ophy.~g
ployee is involved in the espousal of religious views through example,
and a requirement that nonbelievers be hired is an unconstitutional
burden on the dissemination of King's Garden's religious beliefs.79
4. T h e right to be free from government definition of religion.
T h e FCC regulations, which allow discrimination only where a person is
"hired to espouse a particular religious philosophy over the air,
raise
the additional problem of defining "espousal of religion." There is substantial authority for the proposition that the very existence of discretionary power to define what is and what is not religious activity violates
the free exercise clause.81 For example, in Cantwell u. Connecticutg2 the
Supreme Court examined a statute which prohibited the solicitation of
money for religious causes without first obtaining a license. Under the
statute a state official was given authority to deny a license whenever he
determined that the cause was not religious. The Court, in striking down
this discretionary licensing system as "a previous restraint upon the free
exercise of religion," stated:
[t]o condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious
views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden
burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution.83

Similarly, in the instant case the Commission conditions the applicability
78Petitioner's Reply Brief at 21 draws this analogy:
Comparison might be made to a religious leader who proposed to hold a public meeting,
and in connection therewith chooses to hire ushers on the condition that they must share
his religious beliefs. There would be ample justification for this, although it is perhaps a
"nodreligiousWjob, since the ushers in all their actions would be witnessing to the philosophy the religious leader sought to convey.
79The application of the regulations to King's Garden could have been challenged on this
ground, for the Commission has found no espousal of religion in an activity which King's
Garden feels is a significant expression of its sectarian viewpoint. However, the attack was
only on the facial validity of the regulations, and the court of appeals did not regard the
question of application as properly before it.
B0Trygve J. Anderson, 34 F.C.C.2d 938 (1972); See also King's Garden, Inc., 38 F.C.C.2d
339 (1972).
81

I I] t is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice or activity for one group
is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment.
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953). See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
82310 U.S. 296 (1940). This case was actually decided on the broader ground of freedom of
expression, but is often cited in support of the narrower ground of freedom of religious expression. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461-62 (1971).
83Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940). See Love11 v. City of Struthers, 303 U.S.
44 (1938); martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
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of its nondiscrimination regulations upon a discretionary determination
of what constitutes "religious espousal." By forcing the religious organization to bear the burden of establishing that its hiring practices are connected with the espousal of religious views, the Commission places a "forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty. "
Also, the term "espousal of religion" has serious vagueness problems.
T h e Supreme Court has reasoned that, because first amendment freedoms must be given "breathing space" to insure that their exercise will
not be chilled, government may regulate in the area only with "narrow
specificity."84 The Commission's regulations are not narrowly specific.
No definable standards sufficient to give notice to the licensee or to be
reviewed by a court have been produced. Thus the regulation must be
regarded as unconstitutionally vague.
5. The right to be free from regulation of internal affairs. The
final basis upon which the Commission's regulations could be found
unconstitutional is that they constitute an impermissible intrusion by
the government into the internal affairs of a religious sect. For over a
century the Supreme Court has held that matters of church government
and administration are beyond the purview of civil authorities.85 This
position was recently affirmed by the Fifth Circuit in McClure v . Saluation Armyg6 where a female minister, who received a smaller salary and
fewer benefits than male ministers, claimed the protection of the Civil
Rights Act provisions on equal employment. The court, explicitly
limiting its holding to the church-minister relationship, held that the
equal employment provisions of the Civil Rights Act could not be
applied to religious organizations in the hiring of clergy.
Admittedly there is a difference between hiring a minister and hiring
employees for a radio station; the former is much more central to the
sect's hierarchy. But the difference is one of degree, not of kind. Where
broadcasting activities are an essential part of the sect's missionary effort
for the promulgation of its religious beliefs, as was claimed in the instant
case, the operation of the radio station does come within the scope of
church administration and government and should be fiee from government interference.
84NAACP v. Button, 37 1 U.S. 415,433 (1 963).
The court in Banrhaf stated:
Especially with First Amentment issues lurking in the near background, the "public interest" is too vague a criterion for administrative action unless it is narrowed by definable
standards.
Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082,1096 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (footnote omitted).
85Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). See also Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kreshik v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U S . 190 (1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952);
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1920).
s6460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972).
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6. T h e significance of King's Garden's free exercise claims. Arguably, the right to discriminate in employment on the basis of religion is
not significant enough to warrant constitutional protection when balanced against other governmental interests. In Sherberts7 the right to
observe the Sabbath on Saturday was a fundamental element of the
petitioner's religion, and in Yodef18 the Court found that the right of
parents to keep their children from attending public schools was essential
to the perpetuation of the Amish way of life. The right to discriminate
does not occupy such a fundamental position. However, the rights to
maintain one's religion without giving up a state benefit, to disseminate
religious ideas, to be free from governmental definition of religion, and
to be free from the regulation of internal religious affairs are fundamental to religion.89 These free exercise claims must be balanced against the
interests of the state in enforcing the FCC nondiscrimination regulations," and, as the Supreme Court held in Yoder, only those state
interests "of the highest order and those not otherwise served" will take
precedence over free exercise claims.91
T h e Commission cannot claim that it has an interest in promoting the
national policy of equal employment opportunity, for it has been shown
that the regulations conflict with the national policy contained in the
Civil Rights
The only other state interest that could be asserted
by the Commission would be that the "public interest" mandate of the
Communications Act requires stricter prohibitions on religious discrimination because of the peculiar nature of the broadcast industry. Arguably, the fact that airwaves are a limited resource requires that the government closely regulate broadcasting so as to best meet the needs of the
public. It is reasonable to require that those holding licenses meet the
needs of the public audience, and discrimination in employment could
impair a radio station's ability to meet those needs. If this is accepted as
a legitimate state interest, it must be balanced against the interest of the
religious broadcaster in maintaining the religious nature of the organization.
However, the public interest argument cuts both ways, for a failure to
allow religious discrimination will impair the radio station's ability to
meet the spiritual and inspirational needs of the public audience.
Furthermore, no showing has been made that religious discrimination
does impair the station's ability to meet the public needs. It must be
--

,

87374 U.S. 398 (1963). See text accompanying note 72 supra.
88406 U.S. 205 (1972). See note 24 supra.
89See text accompanying notes 64-86 supra.
goseetext accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
g1406 U.S. at 2 15. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
92Seetext accompanying notes 41-50 supra.
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remembered that the presumption favors the religious interests,93 and
unless the Commission can demonstrate some overriding state interest,
the free exercise claims must prevail.

ACT- CREDITOR
DEFINED
AND
Consumer Credit -TRUTHIN LENDING
DAMAGES
AND RESCISSION
JOINTLY
AWARDED
- Eby v . Reb Realty, Inc.,
495 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1974).
In October, 1969, Betty Eby purchased a residential dwelling from
Reb Realty, Inc., for $16,700. T o finance the transaction, Eby assumed
a Veteran's Administration mortgage and executed a second mortgage in
favor of Reb Realty. Eby made subsequent payments on the first mortgage, but ultimately defaulted on both mortgages, whereupon Reb
Realty properly reentered and took possession of the property. Eby sued
in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona for rescission and damages based on Reb Realty's admitted nondisclosure of credit
terms and rescission rights at the time of sale as required by the Truth in
Lending Act (the Act).' Reb Realty argued that it was not a "creditor"
within the meaning of the Act and thus not subject to its provisions. Alternatively, Reb Realty contended that Eby must elect her remedies in
that she was not entitled to both rescission and damages. The district
court granted summary judgment in Eby 's favor, awarding both rescission and damages, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.2

The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act is to enhance economic
stabilization and strengthen competition among those engaged in the
extension of consumer credit. This purpose is accomplished by disclosure of certain credit terms to those who use such credit.3 Among the
matters required to be disclosed are the annual percentage rate of interest, the total amount financed, the amount of periodic payments, and
93See text accompanying note 23 supra.
'15 U.S.C. $8 1601-65 (1970). For a general discussion of the Truth in Lending Act and
TRUTH
IN F ~ AESTATE
L
LENDING
(1970); Aldridge, Truthrelated matters see e.g., J. ABRAHAM,
in-Lending in Real Estate Transactions, 48 N. CAR.L. REV. 427 (1970); Boyd, The Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act -A Consumer Perspective, 45 NOTREDAMELAW.171 (1969);
Griffith, Truth-in-lendingand Real Estate Transactions: Some Aspects, 2 OHION.L. REV. 1
(1974); McLean, The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 24 Bus. LAW. 199 (1968);
Smyer, A Review of Significant Legislation and Case Law Concerning Consumer Credit, 6 ST.
MARY'SL.J. 37 (1974); Warren & Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems of Coverage, 24
STAN.L. Fhv. 793 (1972); Note, Recent Developments in Truth in Lending Class Actions and
Proposed Alternatives, 27 STAN.L. REV.10 1 (1974).
2Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646 (1974). The district court opinion is not officially
reported.
315 U.S.C. $ 1601 (1970).

